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PROBLEMS IN DETERMINING THE DATE OF 
RECEPTION IN PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
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When lawyers need to know the law on a particular subject in a Canadian province 
or territory, they check the relevant legislation and case law. Assuming that the 
lawyer is dealing with a matter within provincial rather than federal jurisdiction, the 
lawyer must consider whether there is something of relevance not only in statutes 
that have been enacted by the legislature of the province or territory, but in statutes 
that might have been included in the body of law that applied when the legislature 
came into existence. A colony governed by the law of England begins life endowed 
with the wisdom and learning expressed in judicial decisions and in the legislation of 
England, or at least as much of the legislation as was suited to the circumstances of 
the colony. The colony receives whatever law exists at a date known as the date of 
reception. Legislatures may choose a date of reception by legislation, but the 
legislature in Prince Edward Island has made no such choice. In these 
circumstances, the date of reception depends on the specific history of the colony, 
including how it came to be a British colony, who lived there previously, and when 
the colonial legislature first met.1 The date of reception of English law in Prince 
Edward Island, then, is found somewhere in the chronology that follows, but exactly 
which date is still an open question.
Long before Prince Edward Island was a British colony or a Canadian 
province, the Mi'kmaq inhabitants knew it as Abegweit or Minago.2 The earliest 
French explorers and settlers noted the presence of Mi'kmaq on the Island, but gave 
the place a new name, Ile Saint-Jean.3 The French capitulation to the British at
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1 Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law  (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966) at 
544-46; J. E. Côté, “The Reception o f English Law” (1977) 15 Alta. L. Rev. 29, provides a comprehensive 
account o f  the doctrine o f  reception including an Appendix on the date o f reception in various jurisdictions 
in Canada.
2 Milton Acorn explains that he chose The Island Means Minago for the title o f  his volume o f poems from 
Prince Edward Island because Minago is a translation o f  the aboriginal word for the Island and “the senior 
race has precedence.” (Toronto: NC Press, 1975) at 9. Abegweit translates loosely as “Cradled on the 
Waves.”
3 The Mi'kmaq presence on Prince Edward Island has not been extensively researched. L. F. S. Upton, 
“Indians and Islanders: The Micmacs in Colonial Prince Edward Island” (1976) 6:1 Acadiensis 21, 
focuses on the establishment o f a Mi'kmaq reserve on Lennox Island, purchased for that purpose in 1870 
by a philanthropic organization; D. C. Harvey, The French Régime in Prince Edward Island  (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1926) at 4-6, quotes Jacques Cartier's account o f  his encounter with Indians on
Louisbourg on 26 July 1758 included an agreement that French soldiers would be 
removed from Ile Saint-Jean as soon as the British acquired transport. The British, 
however, decided to evacuate the Acadian and Mi’kmaq inhabitants, too, although 
two hundred or so of each group avoided evacuation and remained on the Island. 
The Treaty of Paris, signed on 10 February 1763, confirmed Britain’s sovereignty 
over lie Saint-Jean, which the British treated as an uninhabited territory. The French 
name was anglicized to Island of Saint John or Saint John’s Isle, and the territory 
annexed to the existing British colony of Nova Scotia by the Royal Proclamation of 
7 October 1763. A government survey divided the Island into 67 lots, or townships, 
of around 20,000 acres each and on 23 July 1767 these were allocated by lottery to a 
carefully-selected group of about one hundred individuals. Some of these estate 
holders petitioned the Crown to make the Island a separate colony, and on 14 July 
1769, the Crown issued a commission to the new colony’s first governor, Walter 
Patterson. Patterson convened the first meeting of his legislative council on 19 
September 1770 and opened the first session of the Island’s first elected assembly on 
7 July 1773.4
Note that we are dealing here with an abstraction -  a “new” colony exists as 
a juridical entity, but not, at least in its “newness”, as a physical territory. The “new 
world” which the European powers carved up into New France, New Holland, New 
England, New Spain, and so on, was already home to peoples who had their own 
explanations of how the territory they occupied came to be theirs, and their own laws 
and customs for maintaining order in their territory. European international law 
recognized three ways in which a European power could acquire sovereignty over 
territory beyond its existing borders: by conquest, by cession, and by discovery and 
subsequent settlement. In conquered or ceded colonies, the law of the conquered or 
ceded territory continued in effect until changed by the new sovereign power, 
although “barbarous laws, repugnant to the fundamental principles of English law” 
were immediately nullified.5 In a colony acquired by discovery and settlement, the 
settlers received the law in effect in the colonizing country at the date of settlement, 
excluding those statutes or judicial rulings that were clearly unsuited to conditions in 
the colony.6
what became Prince Edward Island, along with other references to Island Mi'kmaq; Earle Lockerby, “The 
Deportation o f the Acadians from lie St.-Jean, 1758” (1998) 28:2 Acadiensis 45 at 71-73, describes the 
role played by Island Mi'kmaq as allies o f  the French against the English.
4 J. M. Bumsted, Land, Settlement, and Politics on Eighteenth-Century Prince Edward Island  (Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987) at 12, 14, 29-34, 40; James Munro, ed., Acts o f  the P rivy Council 
o f  England, Colonial Series, Vol. V, A.D. 1766-1783 (London: 1911) at 80-85; Lockerby, supra note 3, 
estimates that about 3,100 Acadians were deported, 1,400 to 1,500 fled, and 100-200 stayed. The Island 
Legislature adopted the current name for the Island in 1799.
5 Roberts-Wray, supra note 1 at 99-101, 541-542.
6 See Roberts-Wray, ibid. at 540-541. Bruce Ziff, “Warm Reception in a Cold Climate: English Property 
Law and the Suppression o f  the Canadian Legal Identity” in John McLaren, A. R. Buck & Nancy E. 
Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2005) 103, concludes that judges in what became Canada were more willing to reject judicial rulings as 
inapplicable than they were willing to reject statutes, at least in the area o f property law. Determining 
suitability is not simple; see Côté, supra note 1 at 62-81.
As with many other abstract legal principles, the comforting and confident 
simplicity of these rules disappears on contact with the complexity of the world of 
facts. According to accepted principles of international law, a European power could 
acquire sovereignty over only one category of territory by settlement: terra nullius, 
unsettled land, occupied by no one, and thus open for settlement. Although much of 
the “new world” was home to indigenous peoples who had occupied the land long 
before Europeans arrived, acquisition by settlement became the default 
categorization. Terra nullius was a legal categorization, not a literal or factual 
description of whether a land was occupied or unoccupied when “discovered”.7
In Australia, for example, legislatures and courts denied for two hundred 
years that aboriginal peoples had any rights derived from their original occupation of 
the continent. Instead, the Crown granted property rights to settlers as if the English 
had acquired sovereignty by discovering and settling a land that was terra nullius, 
with no existing inhabitants and therefore no existing laws. In legal theory, although 
the aboriginal people lived on and from the land, their presence could not establish 
their ownership of the land; this was because the existing aboriginal inhabitants were 
regarded as so “uncivilized” that they had no laws worthy of recognition. In June 
1992, the Australian High Court rejected the terra nullius theory, at least insofar as it 
invalidated all claims to aboriginal title, ruling that the Crown acquired sovereignty 
over Australia subject to any underlying aboriginal title. The Meriam people, the 
aboriginal title claimants in the case, were living in coastal villages and cultivating 
inland gardens at the time of contact with Europeans. Faced with evidence that the 
Meriam people were an organized society that recognized and enforced claims to 
property rights, the High Court ruled that they could not be characterized as people 
without civilization or law, and therefore that it was no longer appropriate to 
categorize the Murray Islands, where the Meriam people lived, as terra nullius at the 
time of acquisition of British sovereignty.8
The circumstances of European colonization in Canada present the same 
logical and conceptual problem as in Australia. Europeans did not occupy an 
unoccupied territory, nor did they conquer the indigenous peoples. Indeed, in parts 
of the continent, Europeans sought alliances with First Nations in order to better 
pursue their wars against other Europeans, as with the Treaties of Peace and 
Friendship negotiated between the English and the Mi’kmaq in what is now Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick.9 Despite such treaties, and some acknowledgment in 
Canadian courts of the continuing validity of pre-colonization aboriginal customary
7 Roberts-Wray, ibid. at 540; Mabo v. Queensland [1992] 107 A.L.R. 1, Brennan J., at 20-22 [Mabo],
8 Mabo, ibid.
9 For discussion o f  the historical context and continuing validity o f  these treaties, see R. v. Marshall 
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 456; R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533; William C. Wicken, M i’kmaq Treaties on Trial: 
History, Land and Donald Marshall (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 2002). For a critical 
discussion o f historical narratives that treat North America as legally vacant when the Europeans arrived, 
and o f  the legal conclusions that follow from these flawed narratives, see Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal 
Sovereignty and Imperial Claims” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ. 681.
law,10 the Canadian claim to sovereignty rests ultimately on the doctrine of 
discovery. However, as Bruce Ryder observed, “[i]n applying this principle to 
British North America, judges have managed to skirt the fact that Aboriginal Peoples 
did indeed inhabit the territory.”11
Beyond the difficulties of applying the terra nullius theory to occupied 
territory, there are difficulties deciding at what moment a colony is settled, 
particularly with colonies that were settled only after several tries. The history of a 
particular colony, too, may leave questions as to whether it is a settled colony, a 
ceded colony, or a colony acquired by conquest. Nova Scotia, despite being 
occupied by the Mi’kmaq, settled by the French, and ceded to Britain by the Treaty 
of Utrecht in 1713, is treated as an English settled colony. As is evident from the 
brief historical sketch above, Prince Edward Island was both a conquered and ceded 
territory, but it, too, is treated as a colony acquired by settlement.12
Legislation defining the date of reception gives certainty despite difficulties 
in categorizing the facts. In the three prairie provinces and the territories that were 
created out of the lands granted to the Hudson’s Bay Company in May 1670, various 
statutes established a relatively recent date of reception of 15 July 1870. In Ontario, 
legislation established the date of reception as 15 October 1792, the end of the first 
session of the legislature after the new colony of Upper Canada was carved out of 
Quebec. In British Columbia, the legislated date of reception is 19 November 1858. 
In the absence of legislation, judicial rulings may establish dates of reception related 
to the first sitting of the colonial legislature, as is the case in Newfoundland and 
Nova Scotia.13 In New Brunswick, the first colonial administration assumed that the 
date of reception was 8 May 1660, when Charles II was restored to the thrones of 
Scotland and England; this date was confirmed by the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal in 1970.14
10 See Constance Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth Century Canada 
(Toronto: Women’s Press for the Osgoode Society, 1991) at 9-28.
11 Bruce Ryder, “Aboriginal Rights and Delgamuukw v. the Queen" (1994) 5 Const. Forum Const. 43 at 
44, commenting on the decision in the British Columbia Court o f  Appeal. Ryder’s comments on this 
“ugly fiction” woven into “the fabric o f our law” are even more pertinent in light o f  the ruling o f  the 
Supreme Court o f Canada on aboriginal title in R. v. Marshall, R. v. Bernard, 2005 SCC 43, see articles in 
the Special Forum: Perspectives on R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard 55 U.N.B.L.J. 73-176.
12 Côté, supra note 1 at 87; Robert Montgomery Martin, History o f  the Colonies o f  the British Empire 
(London: Dawsons o f  Pall Mall, 1967), categorizes Prince Edward Island as ceded and colonized. See his 
“Statistical Chart o f  the Colonies o f  the British Empire”, categorizing Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia and Cape Breton as conquered and colonized, Newfoundland as colonized and Quebec as 
conquered.
13 Côté, ibid. at Appendix. Newfoundland’s date o f  reception is 1832, the day before the first meeting o f  
the legislature. Nova Scotia's is 3 October 1758, the opening day o f the first legislative session. See also 
Roberts-Wray, supra note 1 at 833-37, distinguishing, where appropriate, between the date o f  reception o f  
English law in civil matters and English law in criminal matters.
14 David Bell, “A Note on the Reception o f  English Statutes in New Brunswick” (1979) 28 U.N.B.L.J. 
195, and “The Reception Question and the Constitutional Crisis o f the 1790’s in New Brunswick” (1980) 
29 U.N.B.L.J. 157. Thus, New Brunswick’s date o f reception is the earliest o f  any o f  the Canadian
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 annexing Prince Edward Island to Nova 
Scotia also introduced English law into all Britain’s newly-acquired French 
territories. As both Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick were annexed to 
Nova Scotia, the law in those territories would have been the existing law of Nova 
Scotia including received English law. The 1769 order in council establishing Prince 
Edward Island as a colony separate from Nova Scotia is silent as to the content of the 
body of law received in the new colony, nor did the Island legislature address the 
question. In 1806, John Stewart, a land agent on Prince Edward Island, and son of 
the Island’s chief justice, Peter Stewart, published an account of the Island that he 
hoped would attract immigrants. He included a chapter on the Island’s laws, 
explaining that British colonies “are understood to take the common law, and all the 
Statute Law of England antecedent to their establishment, which may be applicable 
to their situation and circumstances.” He then summarized “the innovations” on 
English law that had been enacted by the Island legislature, without identifying the 
date for determining what law had been received.15
In 1839, the question of Prince Edward Island’s date of reception arose in 
the context of determining whether it was possible for someone to gain title to Crown 
land by adverse possession. At common law, time did not run against the Crown’s 
right to bring an action to eject someone wrongfully in possession of Crown land; the 
Latin maxim expressing this rule is nullum tempus occurrit regi. In England, this 
rule was changed by the Nullum Tempus Act, providing that the Crown would be 
barred from asserting claims to land after sixty years. This Act was passed in 1769, 
after the date of reception in Nova Scotia, but before Prince Edward was made into a 
separate colony.16 Whether the Act formed part of the starting law of the new 
jurisdiction of Prince Edward Island thus depended on Prince Edward Island’s date 
of reception. The Island’s Attorney General, Robert Hodgson, and the Island’s 
Solicitor General, James Peters, when asked for their opinions on the matter by the 
Island’s Legislative Council, concluded that the Nullum Tempus Act was not part of 
the received law of Prince Edward Island.17
jurisdictions, and is earlier than the date o f acquisition o f British sovereignty over what is now New  
Brunswick. In R. v. Bernard, [2003] N.B.J. No. 320 (QL) at para. 61, the New Brunswick Court o f  
Appeal accepted the trial judge’s finding that the British acquired sovereignty over what is now New  
Brunswick in 1759. The case involved a claim to aboriginal title, which must be established as o f  the date 
o f the acquisition o f  sovereignty. At trial, the aboriginal claimants argued that the relevant date was 1763, 
the signing o f the Treaty o f  Paris, while the Crown argued for 1713, the signing o f  the Treaty o f  Utrecht.
15 John Stewart, An Account o f  Prince Edward Island in the Gulph o f  St. Lawrence, North America (New  
York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967) at 272.
16 On the Nullum Tempus Act, 9 Geo. III., ch. 16 in Nova Scotia, see Nickerson v. Canada (Attorney 
General) [2000] N.S.J. No. 176 (Sup. Ct.) (QL), reproducing a legal opinion prepared for the parties by 
Dr. Philip Girard, Dalhousie University, Faculty o f  Law.
17 The question arose in the context o f  debate on the Crown's rights in lands that had been reserved in the 
original Crown grants for carrying on the fishery. See Rusty Bittermann & Margaret McCallum, “The One 
That Got Away: Fishery Reserves in Prince Edward Island” (2005) 28(2) Dal LJ. [forthcoming 2006],
Hodgson and Peters each began with the general proposition that the 
common law of England is the common law of the colonies, and that all statutes 
passed in England prior to the settlement of a colony are also part of the law of the 
colony. Statutes passed in England subsequent to the colony’s settlement, however, 
did not become part of the law of the colony, unless the statute stated expressly that 
it was intended to apply in the colony. Hodgson and Peters agreed that the Nullum 
Tempus Act did not apply in Nova Scotia, and therefore, did not apply in Prince 
Edward Island. As a general rule, with the division of one colony into two, the 
existing law in both colonies continued as it had been at the time of the division, 
until changed by legislation.18 Peters argued that French law would have continued 
in force in Prince Edward Island until the conquered territory was annexed to Nova 
Scotia, when Nova Scotia law would have applied as provided for in the Royal 
Proclamation. After Prince Edward Island's separation from Nova Scotia, the 
existing Nova Scotia law would have remained in force in Prince Edward Island, 
until altered by the Island legislature. Peters noted that after the imperial government 
created New Brunswick as a colony separate from Nova Scotia, the new government 
expressly repealed all of the statute law of Nova Scotia, so as to start afresh. Prince 
Edward Island did not pass legislation repudiating its inheritance from Nova Scotia, 
and so its starting law was that in effect in Nova Scotia as of Nova Scotia's date of 
reception, along with legislation passed in Nova Scotia prior to Prince Edward Island 
becoming a separate colony. As Peters argued, “where a Colony is divided into two, 
the mere effect of that division cannot be to deprive the part separated of laws by 
which it was previously governed, or to introduce Statutes which before had no 
operation.”19
Imperial officials accepted that time did not run against the Crown in Prince 
Edward Island, implicitly acknowledging that the Nullum Tempus Act was not part of 
the Island's received law, and thus that the date of reception of Island law was earlier 
than 1769, the date when both the Nullum Tempus Act was passed and when the 
Island became a separate colony from Nova Scotia.20 There are various possibilities 
for an earlier date of reception. The earliest would be 6 May 1749, the date of the 
commission given to Edward Cornwallis, Governor of Nova Scotia, instructing him 
to convene a legislative assembly and to establish courts for the determination of
18 In a recent application o f this rule, the laws o f  the Northwest Territories continued in force, mutatis 
mutandis, in the new Territory o f  Nunavut that came into existence on 1 April 1999. See Nunavut Act, 
S.C. 1993, c. 28, s. 29.
19 Colonial Office 226/82/95-103, Bannerman to Newcastle, 6 Dec 1853, enclosing “Opinion of  
Honourable Robert Hodgson on Queries C [1839]” as Appendix C and “Opinion o f  Honourable James H. 
Peters on Queries C [1839]” as Appendix D; quotation at 101. As Peters explained, he and Hodgson 
offered their opinions without having had access to the basic documents establishing the Island as a 
separate colony. Neither the Royal Proclamation nor the instructions to the Island’s first governor were 
available on the Island. The New Brunswick legislation to which Peters referred (31 George III, c. 2) was 
enacted in 1791, several years after New Brunswick was created as a separate jurisdiction in 1784. The 
legislation declared that statutes enacted in Nova Scotia prior to New Brunswick’s creation henceforth had 
no force or validity in New Brunswick.
20 CO 226/88/400-406, Murdoch and Rogers to Merivale, 10 March 1857.
civil and criminal causes. Roberts-Wray gives this as the date of reception for both 
Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, but raises the possibility that the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 may have superseded the commission of 1749, and thereby 
made English law as of 1763 the received law in the existing colony of Nova Scotia 
and the newly-acquired territory annexed to it.21 Constitutional law scholar Peter 
Hogg shares Roberts-Wray's view that Prince Edward Island's date of reception is 
“probably” the same as Nova Scotia's, by virtue of its annexation to that colony; 
Hogg identifies that date as 1758.22 A.H.F. LeFroy, a constitutional law scholar of 
an earlier generation, argued that the date of reception for Prince Edward Island is 
1773, when the Island legislature enacted its first statute.23 J.E. Côté offers the date 
of the Royal Proclamation, 1763, as the date of introduction of English law into 
Prince Edward Island, but does not discuss whether the law thus introduced was the 
law in effect in England or in Nova Scotia.24
Judges rule on questions of reception when one party relies on legislation 
that the other party asserts is not part of the law of the jurisdiction, either because the 
imperial government enacted the legislation after the date of reception, or because it 
was excluded from the body of received law because of its unsuitability to the 
conditions of the colony. In many cases in nineteenth-century Prince Edward Island, 
judges applied English statutes in reaching their conclusion without objections from 
either party.25 Even when judges had to address the question of whether a statute 
was in force, they could do so without having to determine precisely the date of 
reception, provided that the statute was passed prior to the earliest possible date of 
reception in Nova Scotia. Thus, in 1879, when Justice Hensley of the Prince Edward 
Island Supreme Court ruled on the applicability of an English statute, he began by 
noting that Nova Scotia received the statute when it became a British colony. It 
followed, then, that it was included in the law that Prince Edward Island received 
when it became a separate colony from Nova Scotia. As the statute in question had 
been enacted in the reign of Edward I (1274-1307), it did not affect the outcome 
whether the date of reception in Nova Scotia was 1763, as Justice Hensley believed, 
or a date much earlier or much later. Nor did it matter to the outcome that Justice 
Hensley conflated the date that the Island was created as a separate colony (1769) 
with the date that the Island legislature first met (1773).26 Subsequent judges have
21 See Roberts-Wray, supra note 1 at 835-36, who does not note that the date o f  the meeting o f Nova 
Scotia’s first legislature, in 1758, is generally accepted as the date o f  reception for Nova Scotia.
22 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law o f  Canada (Scarborough: Thomson, 2003) at 42.
23 A Short Treatise on Canadian Constitutional Law  (Toronto: Carswell, 1918) at 52. LeFroy rejects the 
basis o f  Peters’ argument, quoted above, in suggesting that 1784, the date o f  the creation o f  New  
Brunswick out o f Nova Scotia, is the date o f  reception for both provinces.
24 Côté, supra  note 1 at 88.
25 For these cases, see Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, “British Statutes in the Emergent Nations o f  North 
America: 1606-1949” (1963) 7 Am. J. Legal Hist. 95 at 109-11.
26 Cantelo v. Beales (1878), 2 P.E.I.R. 292 (Sup. Ct.) at 294-95.
assumed that the law of England in force in 1773 is the law of Prince Edward Island, 
except where changed by Island legislation.27
Active, creative legislatures will, over time, render the reception issue 
increasingly irrelevant by replacing received law with local legislation that deals 
with local problems. The question that caused Hodgson and Peters to consider the 
date of reception -  whether time ran against the Crown -  was resolved, obliquely, 
with passage of The Limitations o f Action Act in 1939, defining “action” as “any civil 
proceeding, including any civil proceeding by or against the Crown.”28 An 
authoritative determination of the date of reception awaits a court case in which a 
litigant's rights depend on legislation enacted in the United Kingdom between 1749 
and 1773, or, failing that, when there is enough interest in the question to generate a 
legislative solution. Neither is likely, and so 1773 will prevail, perhaps for no better 
reason than that it was the date given in the text cited in 1971 by Island lawyers 
arguing before the Master of the Rolls about whether a UK statute of 1677 was part 
of Island law.29
27 Delima v. Paton, (1971) 1 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 317 (P.E.I. Sup. Ct - Ch. D.), ruling on the Statute o f  
Frauds, 1677 (Imp.), 29 Charles II, c. 3, quoting LeFroy, Canadian Constitutional Law [Delima] ', Coles v. 
Roach, (1980) 112 D.L.R. (3d) 101 (Sup Ct. - T. D.), ruling on the existence o f a tort action for criminal 
conversation. These cases are cited in J. M. Bumsted's discussion o f  reception in “Politics and the 
Administration o f  Justice on Early Prince Edward Island, 1769-1805” in Christopher English, ed., Two 
Islands: Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island: Essays in the History o f  Canadian Law, vol. IX 
(Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2005) at 51- 
52.
28 S.P.E.I. 1939 (3 Geo VI), cap. 30, s. 2(a).
29 Delima, supra note 27.
